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Abstract
The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and 
widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the refer-
ence of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the 
competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to 
realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the 
competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge 
to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the 
falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to 
specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making 
property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally 
regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The 
failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point 
at which ethics and metaethics overlap.
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The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and 
widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the ref-
erence of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the 
competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to 
realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the 
competent use of normative predicates.1 For non-naturalistic realists, 
1 Since anti-realists generally deny that moral judgments involve predication, 
on their view the semantic value of moral judgments does not involve reference 
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who assert that normative properties2 are non-natural, the puzzle is 
to account for how non-natural properties might causally regulate 
anything. Non-naturalists like Shafer-Landau (2003) define norma-
tive properties in terms of non-identical concatenations of natural 
properties, but by denying identity such views threaten to deny that 
the reference of normative predicates is fixed. Non-naturalists could 
of course decline the challenge and jettison CTR. Naturalists, by con-
trast, regard normative properties as natural properties, and would 
seem to have an easier time accommodating CTR. Cornell realists 
like Sturgeon (1988) assert that normative properties are natural 
properties in their own right, and presumably such normative prop-
erties are available to play a causal role in reference. Reductive natu-
ralists like Railton (1986) claim that normative properties are reduc-
ible to descriptive properties, and the reduction base might regulate 
competent use.
CTR might pose a challenge to first-order ethical theorists as 
well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any nor-
mative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what 
purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property 
(FRM). Long contends (bracketing his discussion of the possibility 
of multiple FRM’s) that the notion that the FRM causally regulates 
competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The argu-
ment relies on two assumptions, namely:
A1. A purely descriptive property is a FRM only if the moral 
property of being right exists.
A2. If the moral property of being right exists, then our predi-
cate ‘right’ refers to it.
By CTR, if a property F causally regulates competent use of the pred-
icate ‘right’, then ‘right’ rigidly designates F. By A1 and A2, ‘right’ 
to properties.
2 I follow the now fairly standard usage of Jackson (1998: 120-121), according 
to which a normative property is a property that may be ascribed by a norma-
tive predicate, and a descriptive property is a property that may be ascribed by a 
descriptive predicate. For an accessible discussion of Jackson’s reductionism, see 
Streumer 2011.
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refers to and thus rigidly designates the property of being right. It 
follows that the property of being right is identical to F, and Long 
claims that this consequence renders the explanation of rightness ab-
surd. Ethical theory postulates a FRM in order to explain the prop-
erty of being right, but according to Long it is absurd to think that 
one property might explain another when they are identical. Hence 
the reductio of the claim that the FRM causally regulates ‘right’. And 
this conclusion poses a dilemma: either there is no FRM, contrary to 
ethics, or nothing causally regulates ‘right’, contrary to CTR.
The reductio argument is confused, however, and we can begin to 
see why by inquiring about the role the FRM plays. By definition, 
the FRM is a descriptive property such that whatever has it is right, 
which is to say is such that, given CTR, the FRM regulates com-
petent use of ‘right’. Historically, candidates for the FRM have in-
cluded such properties as maximizing pleasure or agent-neutral value 
and compliance with the categorical imperative. One way to unpack 
the notion that the FRM is “right making” is to say that the FRM just 
is — or constitutes — the property of being right, and that this con-
stitutive fact explains the identity. On this understanding, both A1 
and A2 turn out to be unproblematic. A1 is true because, if the FRM 
is the property of being right, then the property of being right exists. 
A2 and the identity together imply that ‘right’ refers to the FRM.
Long’s reductio turns on the idea that, if two properties are iden-
tical, then it is absurd to think that one property might explain the 
other. Long (2012: 278) claims that, if the FRM and the property 
of being right are identical, then “the property that ultimately ex-
plains an action’s being right [the FRM] just is the property of being 
right. That is absurd, however: the property that explains an action’s 
being right cannot be identical to the property of being right” (origi-
nal emphasis). Long’s point might be that if the explanandum and the 
explanans are identical, it is absurd to think that we could have an 
adequate explanation. Since it is the properties and not the explana-
tory expressions that are supposed to be identical, this charge cannot 
be quite right. If the explanation we seek is causal, Long might be 
claiming that CTR and ethical theory together entail that cause and 
effect are identical. That would indeed be an absurd suggestion. But 
the explanation ethical theory seeks is the answer to, “what makes 
actions right”, and this question is not about the cause of rightness so 
Michael Byron142
much as its constitution.
Long’s argument might be a version of Frege’s (1892) puzzle about 
identity: how can we explain the difference in cognitive significance 
between a = a and a = b? The former seems uninformative compared 
to the latter. The terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ refer to the 
same object. But the statement that ‘morning star = morning star’ is 
analytic, whereas the statement that ‘morning star = evening star’ is 
not.  Frege’s solution to this problem invokes his famous distinction 
between sense and reference. The senses of ‘morning star’ and ‘eve-
ning star’ differ, but they have the same reference. The difference 
in sense explains the difference in cognitive significance between 
‘morning star = morning star’ and ‘morning star = evening star.’ 
The sameness of reference is a consequence of the identity.
Perhaps it is misleading to view Long’s argument in light of the 
identity of ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’, which after all name 
an object. Moreover, we do not use the morning star as a causal 
explanation of the evening star, nor would we say that the morn-
ing star constitutes the evening star. The FRM and the property of 
rightness are properties, not objects. The identity of normative and 
descriptive properties usually receives attention from reductionists, 
who argue that they are identical because the one is reducible to the 
other. Schroeder (2005) urges caution in this project: reductionists 
who assume, for example, that the set of properties to be reduced 
and the reduction base are complementary and so disjoint appear to 
contradict themselves. If we define descriptive properties as non-
normative properties, then asserting that normative properties are 
descriptive properties seems to entail a contradiction. Instead, he 
argues, two modes of reduction seem plausible. The first, and the 
one I will discuss, is that developed in Jackson 1998, according to 
which normative properties are reducible to descriptive properties 
because the former constitute a proper subset of the latter. Since 
Jackson defines descriptive properties as those that can be picked 
out by descriptive predicates, his reduction, according to Schroeder 
(2005: 10), “amounts to the claim that normative properties can be 
picked out by uncontroversially descriptive predicates. This is a per-
fectly coherent view” (original emphasis).
A view like Jackson’s can underwrite an explanatory relation be-
tween descriptive properties and the normative properties to which 
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they are identical. Ethical theorists seek a FRM that is identical to 
the normative property of rightness. Suppose value-maximizing is 
the (descriptive) FRM, and suppose that Jackson is right to think 
that the normative property of rightness is reducible to a descriptive 
property. It follows that the properties are identical and that right-
ness is value-maximizing. Moreover, the descriptive predicate ‘val-
ue-maximizing’ picks out the normative property of rightness. Far 
from being impossible or absurd as Long claims, that result would be 
informative and illuminating, since it would explain why maximiz-
ing value is right. The identity of value-maximizing with rightness 
accommodates Long’s assumptions A1 and A2 because the property 
of being right exists and the predicate ‘right’ refers to it. On this 
view ‘right’ refers to the property of rightness, which is also the 
property of maximizing value. The view’s explanatory power lies 
in linking the descriptive predicate to the normative property, not 
in anything mysterious about the identity. And if Jackson is right, 
the fact that the descriptive predicate ‘value-maximizing’ and the 
normative predicate ‘right’ both refer to the same property should 
hardly be surprising: his thesis is that normative properties are a sub-
set of descriptive properties, and thus that all of them may be picked 
out by both normative and descriptive predicates.3
The explanation of rightness in terms of the FRM emerges from 
linking those predicates in certain systematic ways justified by ethi-
cal theory. At issue here could be the sense in which the FRM is 
“right making”, where the FRM constitutes rightness. The relation 
of the FRM to rightness represents a point of contact between eth-
ics and metaethics. Ethics has an interest in the identity between the 
FRM and rightness in virtue of its need to explain rightness in terms 
of the FRM. Such an explanation is useful both practically, by pro-
3 Schroeder’s preferred mode of reductionism does not offer a further alterna-
tive to thinking that the identity of normative and descriptive properties must be 
explanatorily inert. He proposes that we could, for example, reduce normative to 
descriptive properties through analysis rather than, as Jackson does, by regarding 
one as a subset of the other. Schroeder regards this difference as a strength, since 
it enables him to define descriptive properties as non-normative and yet reduce 
the normative to the descriptive without contradiction. As intriguing as it is, his 
view would not yield property identity, which is the sticking point in Long 2012. 
For more detail, see Schroeder (2005: 10ff.).
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viding guidance to decision making, and epistemically, by offering 
resources for justifying action. That is the ethical perspective on the 
question, ‘what makes an action right?’ Metaethics has an interest in 
the identity between the FRM and rightness in virtue of its need to 
explain the semantic value of the predicate ‘rightness’. The ethical 
issue is a question in the metaphysics of morality, since it requires ac-
counting for the sense in which the FRM constitutes rightness. The 
metaethical issue is a question in the semantics of moral language, 
since it deploys the identity of the FRM and rightness in order to 
explain the semantic values of the corresponding predicates.
This point of overlap is important in the context of recent dis-
cussions concerning the relation of ethics and metaethics. Indeed, 
Dworkin (2011) argues vigorously in favor of collapsing the distinc-
tion altogether because, as Kalderon (2013) points out, he thinks 
that all significant metaphysical questions ought properly to be con-
ceived as first-order and substantive. The murky metaethical waters 
of constructivism are beyond our scope here, but it is an interesting 
question whether some similar argument shows that all significant 
semantic questions ought likewise to be conceived as first-order and 
substantive. That would be the relevant point to establish with rela-
tion to the identity of the FRM with rightness. I can only gesture 
at a negative answer: Putnam’s (1976) discussion of the synthetic 
identity of ‘temperature’ with ‘mean molecular kinetic’ energy pre-
supposes a result in physics, but it would be a stretch to conclude 
that it is therefore a contribution to physics. I suspect that a similar 
conclusion might be reached with regard to the semantics of right-
ness given CRT. Though CRT presupposes the identity of the FRM 
with rightness, the account of the semantic values of the correspond-
ing predicates might not thereby constitute a contribution to ethical 
theory. At least, we should await an argument that shows why it 
should do so.4
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